PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED

BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
ADVANCEMSNTS.

In McElroy v. Barkley, 58 S. W. 4o6, the Court of Chancery
Appeals of Tennessee holds that positive testimony of heirs
suffciency at that certain sums paid to them by their intestate

Evidence
were in payment of services performed, and not as
advancements, is sufficient to support a finding that such
payments were not advancements, although there is testimony
of conflicting statements made by the heirs. The danger of
regarding such evidence as sufficient is apparent, but probably
justifiable, since it is in the nature of testimony to rebut a
presumption.
BANKRUPTCY.

The distinction between the contempt of court and the civil
or criminal wrong which may arise from the same state of
Comu tment facts is again drawn in the case of In re Anderson,

for Contempt 103 Fed. 854.

The United States District Court

(S. C.) there holds that an involuntary bankrupt who withholds
property from his trustee is liable to punishment for contempt of
court, and this, too, notwithstanding the provisions in Rev. St.,
§ 99o , providing that no person shall be imprisoned for debt
in any state, on process issuing from a court of the United
States, where, by the laws of the state imprisonment for debt
has been abolished, the Constitution of South Carolina having
forbidden such imprisonment. The court has power to make
the order for the delivery of property, and hence an equal
power to punish for disobedience of it. "But," says the
court, "this power should be most cautiously exercised."
BANKS.

The general similarity between a cashier's check and a certified check, and the rule that for many purposes the latter
appropriates a specific sum- to meet a certain
Dpst,
Effe of
Cashier's

demand, gives plausibility to the contention of
the petitioner in Clark v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,

57 N. E. io6i. He claimed that the cashier's
check given him, the cashier at the same time marking such
734
Chock
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BANKS (Continued).

sum as paid to him, amounted to an assignment of it by the
bank to him and gave him a preference over other creditors.
But the Supreme Court of Illinois held otherwise: that such
check was equivalent to an acknowledgment of indebtedness,
and, though it changed the form of indebtedness, did not
change the fact, the bank remaifting a mere debtor of the
petitioner.
BILLS AND NOTFS.

A question on which conflicting opinions are held by the
courts arose in Brown v.Johnson, 28 Southern, 579. In that
case the defendant had given plaintiffs his note,
riaterM
Alteration and after delivery the plaintiffs added the name of
another thereto as a co-maker. The Supreme Court of Alabama held this a material alteration and that the note was
avoided by it. Even in Alabama this doctrine has not been
consistently upheld. In a somewhat early case, Railroad Co.
v. Hurst, 9 Ala. 513, an opposite view was announced, but
this was subsequently departed from in that state, and the
court acts under these later authorities in its decision. The
basis upon which the alteration is regarded as material is,
according to the court, that" the law proceeds on the idea that
the identity of the contract has been destroyed-that the contract made is not the contract before the court."

CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

In Lockwood v. Lockwood, 83 N. W. 613, an old woman had.
made a conveyance of certain land-practically all the property
coideraton

she possessed-to her son and his children on

of S-uPPort consideration that the son should support her, and
on the further consideration of natural love and affection. The
son failed to keep his part of the contract, and his mother was
sent away from his home. The Supreme Court of Michigan
set aside the conveyance upon these facts, and in answer to
the claim that the rights of the grandchildren under the deed
would thus be destroyed through no fault or misrepresentation
on their part, the court answers that as to them the conveyance is purely voluntary. The basis of the main decision does
not distinctly appear, but the underlying theory seems to be
that the mother had been induced by her son to do this, she
having implicit confidence in him, that there is a strong resemblance to the case where confidence has been reposed
and betrayed, or influence has been acquired and abused.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Constitution of Illinois provides that private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation, a restraint practically equivalent
Police
Power
to that of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. In Frazer v. City of Chicago, 57 N.
E. io55, it was held that this provision did not render the
City of Chicago liable to a property owner whose property
was depreciated in consequence of the location by the city
of a smallpox hospital in the neighborhood. The court lays
down the general proposition that for the doing of an act
clearly within the power of the city under its police power,
where injury is the necessary result of the doing thereof, no
redress can be had, and regards this as clearly within the
police power. The case is a hard one, but the court holds
that no taking of property has occurred, since all property is
held subject to the police power.
COVENANTS.

The modification of the old common-law rule, of the necessity for severance from the freehold in order to change what is
affixed thereto into personalty, appears in Asker
sale of
Trees
Lumber Co. v. Cornett, 58 S. W. 438, where the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that trees, when counted,
marked and sold, to be cut and removed, become personal
property, and, as a consequence, that a covenant of warranty
in a bill of sale of such trees was not a covenant running
with the trees, but was merely personal to the purchaser,
and one who purchased from him could not sue thereon.
CRIMINAL LAW.

In addition to other peculiarities of Kentucky it appears that
she can furnish some novel conduct on the part of prosecuting
Conduct of Officers. In Owens v. Commonwealtk, 58 S. W.
Prosecuting
Officer

422,

this attorney lay down on the floor and

"holloed at the top of his voice" during his argument, for the purpose of bringing vividly before the jury the
facts which he believed the testimony established. The Court
of Appeals held that this was not such improper conduct as
required the court to interfere.
On the other hand, in Oldham v. Commonwealth, 58 S. W.
418, the same court held it improper for the Commonwealth's
attorney, when defendant objected to the testimony, to remark: "Oh, yes; I knew you would object, for it cooks your
goose."
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DEDS.

The perplexing question of what acceptance of a deed is
necessary in order to convey full title comes up again in Knox
Delivery,
Acceptance

v. Clark.6z Pac. 334. In that case a husband was
indebted to his wife, and becoming involved was

requested by her to deed certain property to her, but he did
not promise to do so. Afterward he executed certain deeds
to her without her knowledge, and left them with the proper
officer to have them recorded, and this was done; but they
were not taken therefrom and given to the wife until the
property had been attached by a creditor, and she was not
shown to have had any knowledge thereof before such time.
The Court of Appeals of Colorado holds that there was no
delivery vesting title in the wife before the attachment. The
court refers to the contention that where a deed is for benefit
of grantee, its acceptance will be presumed; but claims that
the presumption only obtains where the facts are unknown,
and since the recorder had not been constituted the wife's
agent and the facts showed no other delivery, delivery to him
for recording was not sufficient to vest title in her. The court
treats it as a case of contract and refers to the necessity for the
"meeting of the minds." It is admitted that decisions are in
existence not in harmony with this view, but it is claimed that
it is supported by the great weight of authority, and this
though the wife sought to accept after she knew of the deed.
It was further argued in this case that the conveyance was
fraudulent as to creditors, but the court held that it was not so,
that he had the right to prefer creditors, of whom his wife, in
this case, was one.
DOWER.

A case in some points almost the reverse of this arose in
New Hampshire. A statute of that state provides that no
conveyance conveyance of lands in writing shall be defeated,
as security or estate encumbered, by an agreement, unless it
is inserted in the condition of conveyance. A husband before
marriage had conveyed land as a security and received a bond
for reconveyance on the payment of the debt. After his death
his administrator paid the debt and had the property conveyed
to himself for theVuse of the estate. It was held that the
widow acquired no dower right in such property. Hall v.
Hall,47 Atl. 79. The court proceeds on the basis that the
statute prevents this from being a mortgage, that hence the
husband had not even an equitable title to the land, but "only
a right to obtain title upon performing the condition of the
bond ;" and whatever rules might be as to dower in equitable
estates, this was not sufficient to support the widow's claim.
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EQUITABLE EASEMENTS.

The general doctrine of the enforcement of the agreements
on the part of the several owners along a given block to build
Injunction only up to a certain line is well known. We have
to Enforce
a modification of this doctrine by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in the case of Ewertsen v. Gerstenberg, 57 N.
E. lO51. Such agreements existed in this case, but the
restriction had not been uniformly observed by the property
owners, who, like the defendant in this case, were bound by
restrictions, nor for that matter by any number of them. The
character of the property had changed (having grown into a
business section) and in consequence, the enforcement of the
restriction would have been a disadvantage to the property
owners generally. On these grounds an injunction to prevent
the defendant's building beyond the agreed-upon line was
refused, the court holding that "all doubts [as to the right to
enforce such restrictions in equity] should be resolved against
restrictions of the free use for lawful purposes of property in
the hands of the owner in fee." Of course this does not interfere with the defendant's liability at law, but such liability
would under the facts be a doubtful source of substantial
damages to a plaintiff.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The tendency of the courts to restrict the operation of the
legislative acts in regard to the rights and liabilities of marNecessrie
ried women is in evidence in numerous cases. A
Furnished
fresh illustration occurs in the case of Ott v. Hento Wife
tall,47 At. 8o, where the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire held that the statutes of that state, enabling married women to hold property to their own use, and enlarging
their rights and liabilities, do not affect the wife's right to
pledge her husband's credit for necessary medical attendance,
nursing and board while compelled to live apart from him by
his misconduct. The court does not examine to any extent
the basis of the husband's liability, assuming as a principle to
start with that it is an obligation of the husband suitably to
maintain his wife. A ground to relieve the husband might
have been found in the theoretical origin othis rule, from the
fact that at common law the husband practically controlled all
his wife's estate and therefore had in cofisequence a duty of
support. When this estate is given back to her control, it
might be argued, such duty ceases; but the court takes the conservative position-a position which is. certainly supported by
common sense.
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INSURANCE.

In Metropolitan Ljfe Insurance Co. v. Blesch, 58 S. W. 436,
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, while admitting that adjuReco veryf dications as to the right of a party to recover
MoneyPaid money paid voluntarily under a mistake of law,
Under ritsake differ greatly in the states of the Union, many of
of Law
them denying relief, holds that the law in Kentucky
is well settled and allows recovery of such money. The rule
is applied to the case where a daughter procured a policy upon
the life of her father without his knowledge or consent. The
court held such policy void as against public policy, but being
convinced that she had paid in good faith and in ignorance of
the law, allowed her to recover what she had paid the
company.
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.

The general rule that a judicial officer is not to be held
liable in a civil action for the performance of his official duty,
Liabliltyfor provided he has jurisdiction of the person and
the subject-matter, is applied by the Court of
wrongful
Arrest
Appeals of Kentucky. in Dizon v. Cooper, 58 S.W.
437, to the case where a justice of the peace acts within his
jurisdiction in issuing a warrant and trying the defendant
thereunder. It is held he is not liable civilly, though the acts
charged did not constitute an offence and though he was actuated by malice.
POWERS.

The broad general rule that a person should not "take all
the benefits of property with the right to dispose of it at his
DebtsofDone. death as he pleases, without the same being
of Power subject to the payment of his debts," since
this is an "idea inseparable from the institution of property,"
is a principle that is continuously appearing and reappearing
in the decisions. The Court of Virginia rather reluctantly
follows former authority, and decides this rule not controlling
in the case of Humphrey v. Campbell 37 S. E. 26. There
a trust deed directed trustees to pay the income of an estate
to the testatrix for life, and power to her to dispose of estate
by will. She gave to certain persons other than those who
would have taken by the laws of descent. Held that the
estate was not liable for her debts. The main reason given is
that since the appointment is to be by will she can derive no
control of such trust estate. A Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277, is cited, among others, as holding a contrary view.
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SALES.

An offer was made by a firm to A. to sell him bran at $7.oo
per ton f. o. b. at F., and closed by "hoping to receive your
order." On receipt of this A. immediately teleeasonablgraphed: " Ship fifty tons as per your letter."
essao
Amount of The Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee, in
(looads Ordered College Hill v. Fidler, 58 S. W. 382, held this a
binding contract. The point was made that the amount
ordered was unreasonably great. The court regarded it otherwise on the ground that, though it was proved that an order for
this amount was unusual, one or more retail merchants at the
place had ordered that amount at one time before this, and
that the amount ordered did not exceed the demand of A.'s
trade, and that there was no proof that he knew what quantity the company had on hand, or what it could produce in a
given time. These, in the opinion of the court, are criteria to
judge of the reasonableness of the amount ordered. It is
intimated that a different holding would be had on a "catchorder."
WILLS.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Ellis v. Aldrich,
47 Atl. 95, discusses the effect of the statute of the state proPurchase of

viding that "every devise or bequest by the hus-

band or wife to the other shall be holden to be in
lieu of the rights which either has by law in the estate of the
other, unless it shall appear by the will that such was not the
intention." It is held that this provision, where applicable,
renders the wife or husband a purchaser of the beque.t or devise, and hence as entitled to a preference over the general
legacies in case there are not sufficient assets to pay all in full.
The narrow boundaries of the rights of an executory devisee
with respect to the property devised appear in Vaughn v.
Executory
Tealey, 58 S. W. 487. In that case an estate had
Devise
been devised to A. with an executory devise to
others. An order was made charging a certain expense to the
corpus of the estate, and in the proceedings for this the executory devisees were not parties. The estate of A. under the
terms of the devise, having become divested, the question as to
the legality of the order was raised, and it was upheld notwithstanding the non-joinder, the court saying, that A. "occupied
such a relation to the estate as to represent all interests
so far as concerned the preservation of the estate."
Legacy

